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I am an object of myself and of my represen-
tations. That there is something else outside
me is my own product. I make myself. . . . We
make everything ourselves.
—Immanuel Kant,
Opus Postumum, XXII, 82.
Installation and evasion, where being under-
goes the pathetic divide between the univer-
sal that is a thesis and the singular that is
given.
—Reiner Schürmann,
Broken Hegemonies, 488.
At the very moment his ultimate sover-
eignty is secured, Agamemnon’s voice trem-
bles. He sees clearly the “heavy fate” that
binds him, at once and irreducibly, to two
laws—as King, he must sacrifice his daughter
to calm the winds at Aulis, as father, he must
protect his child. His voice trembles as one law
is denied to allow the other to reign supreme.
This is what he says:
For if this sacrifice, this virgin blood, stops the
winds, it is right [qevmi"] for them [his allies] to
desire it with passion, most passionately [ojrga'/
periorgw'/ s<f'> ejpiqumei'n]. May all be well.1
The poet’s language captures the signature of
Agamemnon’s tragic denial. Aeschylus
reduplicates the word ojrghv, which means at
once violent emotion, anger and passionate
suffering, and thus articulates the force en-
demic to the institution of the univocal law.
This orgy of language expresses both the
means and the manner in which the law is es-
tablished: As the law of the patriarchy is in-
stalled “with passion,” the law of the father is
“most passionately” denied.2 This denial is
amplified by the prefix peri-, which means
“exceedingly,” and so gives voice to a certain
excess. This singular here, Iphigenia, is sacri-
ficed in the name of a divine qevmi" appealed to
by a King set on consolidating his authority ab-
solute.3 Yet the poet refuses to pass over this
moment of rupture in silence. His language
trembles and the tragic denial that institutes
the law is exposed. In and through language, a
rupture appears that undermines the ultimate
authority of the patriarchal law.
The Trace of a Denial
In a 1763 text titled Der einzig mögliche
Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des
Daseins Gottes at the moment he attempts a
positive articulation of the meaning of exis-
tence, Kant’s voice trembles. There the nature
of Dasein is determined at first by a distinction
between the simple Position of a thing and that
which is posited [gesetz] in relation to some
other thing. Kant writes: “Existence is the ab-
solute position [Position] of the thing and thus
is distinguished from every predicate which as
such is always posited [gesetz wird] merely
with respect to some other thing.”4 Immedi-
ately, however, Kant seems to collapse the dis-
tinction: “The concept of Position or Setzung is
totally simple and on the whole identical with
the concept of being in general.”5 Here, Kant’s
voice can be heard to tremble; for the differ-
ence between Position and Setzung is elided by
a disjunction that identifies the two. This dis-
junctive conjunction voices the trace of what
Reiner Schürmann calls a “double comprehen-
sion of being” in Kant.6
Schürmann’s engagements with Kant, both
in his 1984 essay “Legislation-Transgression:
Strategies and Counter-strategies in the Tran-
scendental Justification of Norms” and in his
magnum opus, Broken Hegemonies, are
guided throughout by an attentive reading of
the dynamic play between Position and
Setzung in Kant, a play of language that is said
to articulate two senses of being that shatter the
autonomy of the transcendental subject, ren-
dering it incapable of serving as the ultimate
principle of legislative authority. In the com-
plex and dynamic ways Position and Setzung
are said in Kant, Schürmann discerns a tension
between two senses of being that can be ini-
tially stated as follows: On the one hand, being
is one of the categories through which the un-
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derstanding gives rise to objects of possible ex-
perience; on the other hand, being is under-
stood in a “pre-categorial” sense as pure
givenness as such. Drawing on a remark Kant
makes in the Critique of Judgment in which the
term Position is used to designate “the repre-
sentation of a thing with respect to our con-
cept” and Setzung is used to point to the “thing
in itself (apart from this concept),” Schürmann
seeks to map these terms onto Kant’s double
comprehension of being by identifying Posi-
tion with the thetic act that gives rise to exis-
tence as the second category of modality and
Setzung with the pre-categorial apprehension
of being as givenness.7
This terminological distinction, however,
as Schürmann himself recognizes, vacillates
as Kant’s thinking shifts under the pressure of
the Copernican turn in which the age old onto-
logical question “What is being?” is at first
subverted by the transcendental step back to
the conditions for the possibility of experi-
ence, only then, in the second edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason, to return with a ven-
geance that threatens to shatter the ultimate au-
tonomy and thus authority of the transcenden-
tal subject.8 By attending carefully to the
manner in which the dual comprehension of
being comes to language in Kant, Schürmann
is able to discern the tragic truth the Kantian
critical project must deny if it is to succeed.
Schürmann puts it this way:
Subjective spontaneity turns received being
against thetic being. This is how the Kantian
gesture that succeeds in instituting the modern
referent remains, despite everything, faithful to
the tragic truth, the truth of the conflict between
the ultimates that have hold of us without re-
course. Kant thematizes these as the impulse (of
natality) toward autonomy, and then again as
the impulse (of mortality) toward heteronomy.
The first leads us to legislate universally. The
second always returns us to the singular that oc-
curs and is given outside of the universal, cate-
gorical law that the understanding declares. The
differend between the conflictual strategies of
being will turn transcendental logic into a bro-
ken imperative ontology.9
Kant’s faithfulness to the tragic truth is only
uncovered by a reading vigilantly attentive to
what shows itself in language. Thus, even if, as
this passage intimates and as Schürmann ar-
gues elsewhere, language is situated on the
side of natality, autonomy, the universal, and
the categorial, it nevertheless remains capable
of articulating something of mortality,
heteronomy, the singular, and givenness as
such. The very trembling of language gestures
to this capacity. Language can thus be heard to
speak differently in those palpable moments
when it encounters something of that which
escapes its own subsumptive strategies.
An Other Language
Schürmann often ident i fies the
subsumptive violence of predication with lan-
guage and associates its universalizing func-
tion with the ontological trait of natality. Thus,
he writes: “Fantasms install themselves as uni-
versals—thetic work proclaims them to be so,
a work that is always accomplished by lan-
guage.”10 For Schürmann, this is the linguistic
work of natality on which life itself, “nour-
ished on common significations,” depends:11
“we are lodged under the violence of the com-
mon, outside of which . . . there is no life.”12
The entire project of Broken Hegemonies can
be understood as an attempt to expose the he-
gemonic fantasms under which each linguistic
epoch wins a life for itself by maximizing the
thetic reality it posits as ultimate even as it de-
nies i ts own collusion in this thet ic
maximization. Schürmann puts it this way:
A fantasm is hegemonic when an entire culture
relies on it as if it provided that in the name of
which one speaks and acts. Such a chief-repre-
sented (hêgemôn) is at work upon the unspeak-
able singular when it calls it a part of the whole;
hegemonies transform the singular into a partic-
ular.13
Although the language of each epoch gives
rise to its particular fantasm—ancient Greek
posits the hegemony of the hen, medieval
Latin that of natura, and modern German the
hegemony of Selbstbewußtsein—the logic of
ultimate referentiality remains fundamentally
consistent: it is predicated on effacing the en-
counter with the singular from which the hege-
monic principle itself is born.
Yet Schürmann does not oppose the posit-
ing of hegemonic principles by means of a de-
terminate negation that would remain bound to
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the same thetic act by which the law is insti-
tuted.14 Rather, through an “analytic of ulti-
mates,”15 he exposes the denial inherent in the
institution of the very principles that make a
common life possible. Schürmann deploys a
topological methodology that seeks to uncover
the place of this denial, the site at which the
thetic thrust of natality encounters and at-
tempts to camouflage the dispersive counter-
thrust of mortality: “Topology seeks to go back
to the given, under the posited.”16 This topo-
logical analytic of ultimates, however, does
not permit natality, the orginary archic trait
that “prompts us toward new commencements
and sovereign commandments,” to pair off
with mortality, the originary dispersive trait
that “wrests us from the world of such archic
referents.”17 Natality and mortality do not
consolidate into a unified system of oppo-
sitions.
However, Schürmann himself articulates
these originary traits in oppositional terms, as-
sociating natality on the one hand with the uni-
versal, the conceptual and the violence of lan-
guage, and mortality, on the other hand, with
the singular, the given and an ineluctable si-
lence.18 Nevertheless, the way the topological
analytic of ultimates is performed in Broken
Hegemonies opens a space for a different un-
derstanding of language in its relation to natal-
ity and mortality, one that Schürmann deploys
but hardly thematizes. This other language is
not subsumptive and apodictic, but rather at-
tentive and apophantic. By attending to those
moments of disruption expressed in and
through language itself, something other than
the subsumptive violence against the singular
is shown to be at work in language. The
apophantic dimensions of language, its capac-
ity to articulate phenomena as they show them-
selves to be, animates Schürmann’s topologi-
cal analytic of ultimates, turning it into a
phenomenology of epochal lovgoi. Here is
heard a kind of “legomenology” in which the
things said in a given epoch themselves are
taken as phenomenological clues to the
originary denial upon which the ultimate refer-
ent of an epoch depends.19
Schürmann attends carefully to the lan-
guage by which the professional philosophers
of each epoch, functioning as what Husserl
called “civil servants of humanity,” institute
and legitimize hegemonic fantasms.20 In so do-
ing, however, he uncovers the language of the
differend—the very articulation of that irrec-
oncilable legislative conflict between two le-
gitimate laws whereby the sovereignty of one
necessarily involves the subversion of the
other.21 The language of the differend gives
voice to an unstable community of relation be-
tween natality and mortality that conditions
human existence. It is heard in the poetic lan-
guage of tragedy that refuses to endure denial
in silence, but attempts to bring the conflict of
ultimates itself to language. Despite his own
deep skepticism about philosophical lan-
guage, Schürmann teaches philosophy the po-
etic language of tragedy and in so doing, reha-
bilitates a philosophical thinking capable of a
kind of “tragic knowledge” that refuses to col-
lude in the delusion endemic to its own legisla-
tive tendencies.22 Indeed, Schürmann insists
that “the differend is articulated in legislative-
transgressive strategies that provide mortals
with their condition of being, a broken condi-
tion that philosophers—those who know how
to read—have never ceased to watch over.”23 In
his careful, provocative and sometimes fantas-
tic readings, Schürmann articulates the
differend that shows itself each time a law is
posited as ultimate.
Kant and the Transcendental Delusion
Kant offers a singularly perspicuous site for
an investigation into the way the differend be-
tween the singular given and the legislating
impulse come to language; for Kant is the mas-
ter legislator who, in decisively establishing
the autonomy of self-consciousness as the he-
gemonic fantasm of the modern age, unwit-
tingly gives voice to “the unsubsumable other
against which spontaneity collides.”2 4
Schürmann articulates Kant’s peculiar relation
to the tragic double bind this way:
With full clarity, he sees a certain originary
break through which the critical turn puts us, in
the final instance, in a double bind. He then
evades the pathetic condition he perceived and
escapes to the terrains adjacent to the transcen-
dental, at times the terrain of the thing-in-itself,
at others the terrain of appearance. It will be
necessary to ask oneself if, here again, Kant has
not recognized, and then denied, an originary
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pathein, a suffering which affects transcenden-
tal being.25
Schürmann pursues Kant’s pathology of legis-
lation first by exposing what he calls the “tor-
ments of autonomy” in which the autonomy of
the transcendental subject is shown to be frac-
tured at its core by “two incommensurable
strategies within the same originarily tran-
scendental freedom.”26 The one, associated
with the transcendental self, names the very
spontaneity that serves as the condition for
possible experience. This is constitutive free-
dom, the autonomy that posits the very laws
that condition all cognition and action. The
other conception of freedom, associated with
the ego, does not of necessity conform to the
rational will—it points to a willfulness de-
prived of rules.27 Schürmann describes the ego
“as the inextirpable tendency to introduce the
other, as a motive and means, right into the
heart of reason.”28 The very possibility of
moral action is itself predicated on an arbitrary
will, pulled by impulses and desires, by “the
murmur of alien, singular, solicitations,” yet
capable of freely choosing to conform to the
moral law or of consciously embracing radical
evil by subordinating itself to the motives of
desire and legislating such subordinations as
maxims.29 The autonomy of the transcendental
self expresses the trait of natality, the auton-
omy of the ego that of mortality. Taken to-
gether, they point to the site of an ineluctable
fissure in the attempt to ground cognitive,
ethical and pragmatic legislation on the
autonomy of the subject.
Yet Schürmann’s reading of the torments of
the autonomy of self-consciousness is in fact
already informed by the suspicion that there is
a deeper, more originary fissure at the core of
Kant’s thinking, a rupture over against which
these torments, however disquieting, appear as
mere symptoms. This suspicion is most clearly
articulated in Schürmann’s introduction to
Part Three of Broken Hegemonies, entitled, “In
the Name of Consciousness: The Modern He-
gemonic Fantasm.” There he writes:
Following the thread of an entirely coherent
concatenation of arguments (even though it has
escaped the attention of most commentators)
from the precritical writings up to the Critique
of Judgment, we will see that a conflict between
two senses of being splits self-consciousness;
that the referent from which the moderns expect
supreme legislation produces, simultaneously
and necessarily, its own transgression.30
To follow the thread of this argument, how-
ever, uncovers the manner in which the
differend at work in all nomothetic legislation
shows itself in language.
The first intimation of this originary con-
flict between two senses of being in Kant has
already been heard in the pre-critical,
1763 Beweisgrund text. There Kant’s voice
trembles as he first articulates a difference be-
tween Position and the sort of Setzung associ-
ated with predication only then immediately to
identify the two.3 1 Strangely enough,
Schürmann does not point to this passage in
the text, but rather to two other passages in
which, he argues, the vocabulary of Setzung re-
fers unequivocally to an originary givenness
that precedes the thetic activity of the subject.
Before turning to these specific passages, how-
ever, it is important to recognize that at least in
the initial articulation of the meaning of Posi-
tion in the Beweisgrund text, the cognate of
Setzung refers not to originary givenness, but
to those relations of predication by which
something is posited [gesetz wird] with respect
to something else. Such predications are
closely associated with the relation things have
to their properties over against which Kant
wants to distinguish the simple concept of Po-
sition.32 By collapsing the difference between
Position and Setzung here, Kant already im-
plicitly opens the space for an another under-
standing of Setzung, one that extends beyond
the positing endemic to predication.33
Schürmann locates precisely such a pre-
predicative apprehension of Setzung in Kant’s
discussion of possibility in the 1763 text.
There Kant considers the formal conditions
under which possibility itself is possible. He
distinguishes between logical impossibility,
which simply involves internal contradiction,
and the vanishing of possibility which happens
“when no matter or no datum is there to
think.”34 This allows Kant first to suggest the
following: “If, then, all existence is denied,
then nothing whatsoever is posited [so ist
nichts schlechthin gesetzt], nothing at all is
given [gegeben], no matter of anything to be
thought upon, and all possibility vanishes en-
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tirely.”35 Here, Kant seems to suggest: nichts
gesetzt, nichts gegeben, nothing posited, noth-
ing given; and when nothing is given, nothing
can be thought and possibility itself disap-
pears. Kant goes on to argue: “That there be
some possibility and yet absolutely nothing
actual, contradicts itself; for, if nothing exists,
also nothing is given which would be thinkable
there, and one would contradict oneself if one
nevertheless pretends that something is possi-
ble.”36 Drawing on these two sentences,
Schürmann generates a poignant equation to
illustrate how Kant consolidates the meaning
of Setzung by identifying it first with the
“given” and then by extending the meaning of
the given to existence. Thus, Schürmann
writes: “Setzung = Gegebensein = Dasein.”37
The articulation of Setzung in the pre-criti-
cal 1763 text is thus said to gesture to an under-
standing of being that precedes the thetic activ-
ity of the subject. Schürmann himself
identifies the relation between saying and be-
ing expressed here with Aristotelian logic,
“where ways of saying reflect, without thereby
creating a problem, ways of being.”38
Schürmann’s own topological analytic of ulti-
mates itself trades on something like the Aris-
totelian recognition that the ways things are
said express something of the truth of being.
Thus, by attending carefully to the way “posit-
ing” is said in Kant, Schürmann is able to un-
cover a pre-categorial apprehension of being at
work in the 1763 Beweisgrund text. This other,
non-thetic sense of positing and with it the
sense of being as givenness is then pursued
into the text of the Critique of Pure Reason
where, under the pressure of the Copernican
turn, there appears a “terminological chias-
mus” between Position and Setzung that artic-
ulates the shifting ontological ground on
which the transcendental project depends.39
In turning to the thetic activity of the tran-
scendental subject in order to secure the condi-
tions for the possibility of experience, Kant
trades on and yet covers over the originary
sense of being as extrinsic givenness, thus ren-
dering all givenness intrinsic under the subjec-
tive conditions of sensibility.40 Yet, for
Schürmann, the Copernican turn, however
radical, “cannot disown a certain understand-
ing of being.”41 The sense of being as extrinsic
givenness and articulated in the 1763 text by
cognates of Setzung, remains operative in the
Critique of Pure Reason, although there Posi-
tion rather than Setzung expresses the pre-
categorial sense of being as givenness.
Schürmann locates this terminological chi-
asmus in two texts from the 1787 second edi-
tion of the Critique of Pure Reason where
Setzung and its cognates come to designate the
categorial sense of being that results from the
positing activity of the mind, whereas Position
is said to gesture to extra-mental being as
givenness. First, in the discussion of sensibil-
ity in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant re-
peatedly deploys the cognates of setzen to des-
ignate the manner in which the mind affects
itself by its own capacity for sensible intuition.
Thus, Kant writes:
Now that which, as representation, can precede
any act of thinking something is intuition and, if
it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of
intuition, which, since it does not represent any-
thing except insofar as something is posited
[gesetzt] in the mind, can be nothing other than
the way in which the mind is affected by its own
activity, namely this positing [dieses Setzen] of
its representation, thus the way it is affected
through itself.42
Here, gesetzt and setzen articulate the self-af-
fective activity of the mind. They point not to
being as pure givenness, but to the mind’s re-
ceptive capacity under the subjective condi-
tion of sensibility. The repetition of cognates
of Setzung in this passage expresses intrinsic
rather than extrinsic givenness.43 The Coperni-
can turn has thus turned the meaning of
Setzung. Although it retains here a sense of
givenness, it no longer points to the pre-
categorial givenness of being, but to the self-
affective activity of the mind by which it gives
itself representations. Indeed, if the transcen-
dental project is to succeed in uncovering the a
priori conditions for the possibility of experi-
ence, it must deny the very possibility of a
givenness outside the purview of the self-
affective activity of the subject.
Yet Schürmann’s analysis exposes this de-
nial by attending to the decussating senses of
Setzung in order to articulate a tension in the
meaning of givenness Kant somehow recog-
nizes but nevertheless shrouds. Thus, in a poi-
gnant moment at the end of the first step of the
transcendental deduction in which Kant at-
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tempts to abstract from sensibility in order to
uncover the conditions for the possibility of
the understanding,44 he admits the following:
In the above proof, however, I still could not ab-
stract from one point, namely, from the fact that
the manifold for intuition must already be given
prior to the synthesis of understanding and in-
dependently from it; how, however, is here left
undetermined.45
Schürmann reads this as a gesture to another
sense of givenness, here intimated only to be
left undetermined; the very question as to how
what is given in intuition is itself given to intu-
ition remains inaccessible. And yet, in the
shifting meaning of Setzung something of an
originary givenness, of an irreducible suffer-
ing, comes to language. Schürmann puts it this
way: “These problems are knotted together in
affection. It is in affection that position [i.e.,
Setzung] now turns aside from givenness and
that makes the regime tremble.”46
Yet, even in the Critique of Pure Reason,
where Setzung and its cognates articulate the
manner in which all givenness must run neces-
sarily through the subjective conditions of sen-
sibility, another sort of givenness comes to lan-
guage in a second text to which Schürmann
appeals as he attempts to hear in the vacillating
meaning of Position and Setzung a denial of
the meaning of being as givenness. In the sec-
tion entitled On the Impossibility of an onto-
logical proof of God’s existence, Kant fa-
mously claims: “Being is obviously not a real
predicate, i.e., a concept of something that
could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely
the Position of a thing or of certain determina-
tions in themselves.”47 In a footnote to his
1984 text on legislation that anticipates the
deeper reading of Kant pursued in Broken He-
gemonies, Schürmann appeals to these famous
Kantian sentences in order to insist: “‘Posit-
ing’does not mean here the self-instituting of a
supreme ground but the fact that in experience
something is being experienced. Positedness
means facticity. It enters language through the
copula.”48 Schürmann thus reads the term Posi-
tion in Kant’s discussion of the ontological
proof in the Critique of Pure Reason as gestur-
ing to extrinsic being as pure givenness that
precedes all operations of the transcendental
mind.49 Position names here what Setzung
named in the 1763 text: the extrinsic givenness
of being. Even here, however, a strict termino-
logical distinction does not hold, for in analyz-
ing the sentence “God is omnipotent,” Kant in-
sists that it contains two concepts, God and
omnipotence, while “the little word ‘is’ is not a
predicate in it, but rather only that which posits
[setzt] the predicate in relation to the sub-
ject.”50 If positedness means facticity here and
comes to language through the copula, it does
not settle squarely into the terminological dis-
tinction between Position and Setzung, for
both terms seem ambiguously capable of
pointing to the categorial and pre-categorial
senses of being. Kant’s language here again
trembles. Schürmann himself insists that no
definite terminological distinction between
Position and Setzung is established until, in the
Critique of Judgment, Kant returns to the ques-
tion of the possible in relation to the actual in
order to claim that “the former [namely, the ac-
tual] signifies only the Position of the repre-
sentation of a thing with respect to our concept
and, in general, our faculty for thinking, while
the later [namely, the actual] signifies the
Setzung of the thing in itself (apart from this
concept).”51 Here the terminological grounds
have shifted again, and Position names
categorial, intrinsic being, while Setzung
names extra-mental being as givenness apart
from the concept.
In this articulation of Setzung, which is said
to point here to an actuality outside the con-
cept, Schürmann hears the echo of an originary
suffering on which all transcendental positing
depends. He writes:
Position emphasizes, then, the relation of a con-
ceived representation to the understanding, and
hence, the possible; Setzung emphasizes the re-
lation to sensibility of the material one suffers,
and hence the actual. Thus the singular is recog-
nized in its contingency and randomness.52
Attending to the ambiguity of being voiced in
the ambiguity of language at play in the vari-
ous senses of Posi t ion and Setzung ,
Schürmann brings the agony of Kantian
theticism to language, thus giving voice to the
“pathetic condition of being” Kant is said to
have “seen clearly” and insistently denied.53
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The Logic of Denial
If in the Critique of Pure Reason, the am-
biguous play of Position and Setzung gives
voice to the manner in which an obstreperous
givenness, despite all evasion, intrudes upon
transcendental self-consciousness from with-
out, the fundamental yet enigmatic distinction
between the I-think and the I-am in Kant ex-
poses transcendental self-consciousness to
singularity from within. Schürmann traces the
logic of Kantian denial to the site of this dis-
tinction. A brief account of the play between
the I-think and the I-am in Kant articulates a
tension that must be denied if the transcenden-
tal subject’s ultimate legislative authority is to
be secured. In articulating the manner in which
singularity at once intrudes upon the subject
from without and shatters it from within,
Schürmann’s reading of Kant allows us to dis-
cern another language of natality, one that is
not simply subsumptive in nature, but also ca-
pable of bringing to expression a kind of tragic
knowledge vigilantly attuned to the violence
of its own operation.
Toward the end of the transcendental de-
duction, in §25, Kant returns to the original
synthetic unity of apperception in which, he
says, “I am conscious to myself not as I appear
to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I
am. This representation is a thinking, not an in-
tuiting.”54 According to Schürmann, this sim-
ple awareness that I am cleaves heart of tran-
scendental spontaneity.55 This can be heard in
an enigmatic and poignant note found in the
middle of the section in which Kant writes:
“The I think expresses the act [Actus] of deter-
mining my existence. The existence is thereby
already given, but the way in which I am to de-
termine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit
in myself [in mir setzen solle], is not yet
thereby given.”56 Here the term setzen remains
firmly situated within the transcendental appa-
ratus insofar as it is associated with the way the
mind gives itself the intuitions according to
which something may be cognized. Yet Kant
here seems to open the space in which to think
an existence apart from what is given in intu-
ition, that is, apart from the transcendental
conditions under which experience first be-
comes possible. This existence is the simple
awareness that I-am, itself neither noumenal
nor phenomenal.57 This awareness of the I-am
seems to escape the productive powers of the
transcendental subject, and yet, there it is. The
other strategies of evasion Kant deploys to
cover over this sort of insistent givenness—to
declare it noumenal and thus outside scope of
the transcendental project or to crush it under
the thetic regime of subjective spontaneity—
remain unavailable, for in the I-am, an irreduc-
ible awareness of my own singularity an-
nounces itself. With the I-am, the I-think en-
counters itself as singular. Schürmann puts it
this way: “if its nature is that it ‘determines my
existence,’ then the I-think will have to be ad-
joined to an indeterminate givenness as equi-
originary. The I-am singularizes the I-think,
the universal legislator.”58
Transcendental legislation shows itself here
as pathological; for it remains conditioned by
an irreducible givenness, a pathos, that at once
escapes and makes possible the legislative
spontaneity of the transcendental subject.59
The subject is thus exposed to a suffering it did
not make and cannot escape. According to
Schürmann, Kant sees this “with full clarity,”
but then denies it: “The transcendental critique
recognizes the other that places us at its mercy,
but it denies it as soon as it recognizes it.”60 But
Kant is no Agamemnon; for Agamemnon un-
equivocally recognizes the double bind in
which he is situated. He says explicitly:
Heavy is my fate if I do not obey, but heavy too,
if I slaughter my daughter, delight of my house,
by maiden sacrifice, staining these father’s
hands with rivers of blood beside the alter. What
of these things is without evils?61
Kant’s recognition is neither seen with such
clarity nor voiced with such urgency.
Schürmann himself admits that the tragic dou-
ble bind that conditions the hegemonic
fantasm of modernity is heard not so much in
what Kant explicitly says, as in the vehemence
by which the sense of being as givenness is de-
nied.62 Yet even this suggests perhaps too
much, for the Kantian denial of singularity it-
self comes to language precisely as Kant so
powerfully articulates the legislative thrust of
transcendental subjectivity. The very positing
of the ultimate authority of the subject brings
the singular to language. Here, perhaps, we are
not dealing with recognition and denial, but, to
use the Freudian vocabulary, with a pre-con-
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scious awareness of the conflict and its repres-
sion.63 Freud develops his understanding of the
unconscious from the theory of repression in
which an idea that is, for whatever reason, re-
pressed, remains both inaccessible to con-
sciousness and yet effective.64 Some such re-
pressed ideas are said to be ‘unconscious’
when they remain ultimately inaccessible to
consciousness, having been kept from con-
sciousness by continuing pressure, others,
however, are said to be ‘preconscious’ when,
under certain conditions, they are capable of
becoming conscious.65 If these Freudian dis-
tinctions are mapped on to Schürmann’s read-
ing of Kant, perhaps it is possible to say that in
the pre-critical writings and in the first edition
of the Critique of Pure Reason, the sense of be-
ing as givenness and with it the irreducible en-
counter with singularity operate uncon-
sciously in Kant. The repressed conflict
between two senses of being is heard, how-
ever, in the way Kant’s voice trembles as he ar-
ticulates the nature of existence and its relation
to positing. Thus, although the trace of that
other sense of being as givenness comes to lan-
guage here, it remains inaccessible to Kant.
With the Copernican turn, however, and more
specifically, with the second edition of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, where Schürmann in-
sists that Kant took “a step forward, and a giant
leap at that, toward an abyss traversing being
itself,” Kant encounters something irreducibly
given that conditions the legislative authority
of the subject but is not produced by it.66 The
sense of being as pure givenness threatens to
undermine the entire critical project. It thus
must be repressed by a continuous pressure
that comes to language at certain critical mo-
ments—in the distinction between the I-think
and the I-am, in the repetitive deployment of
cognates of Setzung in describing the subjec-
tive conditions under which intuitions are
given, and in the articulation of the meaning of
existence as Position in the section dealing
with the proof for the existence of God.
Schürmann’s topological legomenology itself
brings these moments to language in such a
way that they can no longer be denied to con-
sciousness. Thus, Schürmann’s analytic of ul-
timates here uncovers a pre-conscious
awareness in Kant of an originary conflict that
must be repressed if the legislative authority of
the transcendental subject is to be securely
established and legitimated. Translating
psychoanalytic repression into the language of
denial, Schürmann writes:
Apart from sporadic assertions of the second
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the
givenness of the singular is only implied with
the doctrinal meaning of being, for it is recog-
nized only through the intensity of the denial, of
the suppression, of the censure, of the endlessly
striving theticism of triumphant, spontaneous
autonomy.67
Yet by tracing the topology of this suppres-
sion, Schürmann brings to language a way of
thinking that can no longer abide the repres-
sion of the originary conflict. In so doing, how-
ever, he practices a way of philosophical say-
ing that is capable of critically engaging the
manner in which language colludes in the vio-
lence of the common on which life itself de-
pends.68
The Voice of Singularity and the
Philosophy-to-Come
Schürmann’s topological legomenology
models a way of thinking and performs a
philosophical saying capable of doing a cer-
tain justice to the suffering of the singular.
Here the genitive is both subjective and objec-
tive, the singular suffers and is suffered—the
encounter with singularity upon which life de-
pends always operates in the middle voice.
This is the ambiguous voice of singularity, the
tremor of mortality heard in and through the
language of natality. Here the language of na-
tality is heard to involve more than the violent
imposition of the subject upon the object, the
forceful suppression of the singular under uni-
versal predicates that render it particular.
Rather, the apophantic dimensions of the lan-
guage of natality itself brings to expression the
voice of the singular, irreducible and insistent,
that irrepressibly operates in all our attempts to
speak and act together in meaningful ways.69 If
Schürmann names the condition that fractures
every referent posited as ultimate “singular-
ization to come,” associating it with the onto-
logical trait of mortality, perhaps the thinking
that remains assiduously attuned to the manner
in which this fracture comes to language de-
spite all attempted repression could be associ-
THE VOICE OF SINGULARITY
145
ated with natality and called a “philosophy to
come” in which the voice of singularity is
heard to express an irreducible otherness that
holds us accountable and opens us always to
new possibilities for community.70
A philosophy to come would then involve
what might be called “mortal natality” and its
chiasmus, “natal mortality.” “Mortal natality”
names the manner in which natal habits of
thinking, acting and speaking not only refuse
to cover over and repress the conditions of
their own operation, but also open themselves
to the possibilities that come to language at the
site of the encounter with singularity. The mor-
tality of natality thus would not forsake the
common altogether, but would inject every at-
tempt to enter into community with others with
a dimension of openness that would render it
inherently unstable and thus always in need of
critical re-articulation. Yet if mortal natality
names the condition under which a philoso-
phy-to-come would need to relate itself criti-
cally to each constellation of community in
which it finds itself embedded, natal mortality
names the condition under which the singular,
despite its ineffable unicity, comes neverthe-
less to language in a way that can be heard to
hold all such critical re-articulations to ac-
count. “Natal mortality” points to the manner
in which death itself refuses mute silence but
continually comes to language with an ur-
gency that can be neither repressed nor denied.
Indeed, the natality of mortality infuses life
with an insistent injunction to respond to the
voice of singularity as the site of an ongoing,
asymmetrical dialogue where new, more just,
beginnings not only become possible, but
insistently necessary.
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